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The  basic  idea  I  want  to develop  and  to substantiate 
in this  paper  consists in replacing  - where  necessary  - the 
traditional concept  of linguistic  category  or linguistic 
relation understood as  'things',  as  reified hypostases,  by 
the  more  dynamic  concept  of dimension.  A dimension  of  lang-
uage  structure is not  coterminous  with  one  single  category 
or relation but,  instead,  accommodates  several of  them.  It 
corresponds  to certain well  circumscribed purposive  functions 
of linguistic activity as  weIl  as  to certain definite prin-
ciples  and  techniques  for  satisfying these  functions.  The 
true universals  of  language  are represented by  these  dimen-
sions,  principles,  and  techniques  which  constitute the  true 
basis  for non-historical inter-language  comparison.  The 
categories  and  relations  used  in grammar  are  condensations  -
hypostases  as it were  - of  such dimensions,  principles,  and 
techniques.  Elsewhere  (Seiler 1976a:  4ff.)  I  have  outlined 
the  theory  which  I  want  to test here  in a  case  study. 
Determination is the  case  in point.  The  term,  like 
such other terms  as  sUbject  or negation,  belongs  to  the 
'universal'  vocabulary  of grammatical  description.  The  no-
tion corresponding to this  term is far  from  being clear. 
There  is no  generally recognized definition of it.  Usually 
there  is a  distinction between  two  terms:  a  determinans  and 
a  determinatum.  It  seems  that  the  relationship between  the 
two  is manifested  in  a  number  of morpho-syntactic  construc-
tions  such  as:  Head-Noun  with adjective  or genitive  or  num-
eral or demonstrative  or article or quantifier or relative 
clause etc.  That  these  and  other constructions  should  be 
determinative  seems  to  be  taken  for granted,  but it is 
left  u~clear why  this should be  so:  why  are  they all in-
stances  of determination?  And  if there is a  common  denom-
inator,  why  should there  be  as  many  different instances? 
Grammarians  might  tell us  that determination has  to  do  with 
the  identification of objects  of reference.  At  first sight 
this  seems  to  be  a  well-circumscribed task.  Why  then  should 
language  provide  such  a  variety and  number  of means  for 
accomplishing it? - 2  -
The  notion  of determination  or determinedness  has  been 
linked to other notions  such  as  definiteness  (Trubetzkoy 
1939,  Moravcsik  1969,  Kramsky  1972).  Trubetzkoy treats both 
as  different,  but  the  difference  does  not  become  quite  clear. 
Moravcsik entitles her well-documented  and  careful  study 
"Determination",  but  throughout  her text  we  find  the  term · 
'definiteness'  and  not  'determination'~  Kramsky  links  'de-
flniteness'  with the  presence  of  certain morphological ele-
ments  such  as  an article or  certain verb: inflectional  end~ngs 
and  uses  'determinedness'  or  'determination'  in a  broader 
sense  to  encompass  such related phenomena  as  demonstratives, 
adjectives,  genitives,  and  relative  clauses.  The  nature  of 
the  relationship  among  all these  constructions  remains  un-
clear.  For  Schwyzer  (1936)  determination is coextensive 
with  the article  syntagm.  Coseriu  (1955/75)  has  a  keen 
sense  of  a  unitary principle which  he  calls determination. 
He  is primarily  interested in the  classificatory distinction 
of different  kinds  of determination  such  as  actualization, 
discrimination,  delimitation,  identification; it is important 
that his distinctions  are  based  on  functional  considerations. 
'Determination'  in a  very  wide  sense  is used  by  Trubetzkoy 
(1939),  Greenberg  (1963),  and,  in a  still broader  sense,  by 
Vennemann  (1974a,  b).  The  former  two  enlarge  the  domain  to 
include  object-verb relationships,  the  object  representing 
the  determinans,  Vennemann  claims  the  relationship to be 
the  same  even  in adverb  (determinans)- verb,  and  in preposi-
tion or postposition - verb  (determinans)  constructions. 
Vennemann  (op.  ci  t.) advocates  the  operator-operand  dichotOIT1Y 
which  he  considers to  be  synonymous  with Trubetzkoy's  deter-
minant-determine  and with the  function-argument  dichotomy 
of  symbolic  logic.  In his  view,  the relation is manifesteq 
in the  following  constructions:  modifier  - head  noun,  object  -
verb,  adverb  - verb,  verb  - preposition,  verb  - postposition. 
The  following  dilemma  recurs  in  some  of the  works  cited 
above  and  in many  other studies  on  the  sUbject  not  cited 
here:  If determination is  tne  universal  category  or  one 
universal relation - universal  being  taken here  in the tra-
ditionG~1 sense  of  'occurring in all languages'  - it seems - 3  -
illogical to inquire  into the  "nature of determination. in 
Modern  German  or in Tagalog
ll
•  On  the other hand,  such prob-
lems  as  these  have  always  been  and still are  legitimate 
topics  of linguistic  investigation.  If we  try to start from 
a  single  language,  we  are still caught  in the  dilemma: 
Kramsky  (1976:182)  frankly  admits  that  "v1e  cannot  give  here 
a  precise definition of  tqe  category  of determinedness  which 
could  be  applied to all languages  concerned",  and  183:  "if 
we  want  to make  an  extensive  tYPological  survey  of the  oc-
currence  of  a  language  phenomenon  in different  languages,  we 
must  sacrifice to this  aim  the  terminological precision". 
In  such  a  view,  then,  a  precise definition of determination 
could  be  given  only  for  a  single  language.  But  hOw,  under 
such  a  view,  can  languages  be  compared  at all?  Linguists 
must  face  the  fact  that  the  very  bases  of interlinguistic 
comparison  are not  yet  clear.  What  is the  tertium  compara-
tionis?  A standard?  An  invariant? 
The  approach  proposed  and  sketched in the  following 
pages  consists  in taking  the  functional  aspects  seriously. 
We  can  take  historical linguistics as  ~ractised in the  com-
parison of  Indo-European  languages  as  a  model.  One  'of the 
major reasons  for  the great  success  of the  latter was  that 
the  basis  - and  also  the  overall purpose  (cf.  Greenberg 
1969:149)  - of genetic  comparison  in linguistics are at 
least intuitively clear;  for  he re  we  are  confronted with  a 
well-circumscribed function,  viz.  language  change.  Languages 
are  compared  to  find  out  that  they  have  changed  and  how  they 
have  changed;  two  words  of  two  languages  are  compared  in 
order to  show  how  in a  more  or  less remote  past  they  were 
the  same  word  of the  same  language,  thus,  to  show  how  diver-
sity develops  out  of unity.  Now,  the  functional  analysis 
of historical evolution is surely not  the  sole  object  of 
linguistic investigation.  However,  non-historical functional 
aspects  are still largely  unknown  to  uso  It is, therefore, 
no  wonder  that  'tYPological'  comparison  - as  Greenberg  (loc.cit.) 
rightly points  out  - has  had  a  much  more  marginal position 
in linguistics than genetic  comparison,  since the  former 
has  lacked,  as it were,  an  apparent  basis  and  a  clearcut - 4  -
goal.  We  must  therefore  undertake  the first  steps  to make 
both the basis  and  the  goal  of non-genetic  comparison  appar-
ente  Our  hypothesis  is that  these  bases  and  goals  must  be 
intimately related to  the  functions  of verbal activity,  and 
that  the  bases  are  not  t o  be  sought  in reified  categories 
f or  w~ i c h universali ty  i s  bei ng  claimed,  but  r ather in di-
mensi ons  established by  certain universally  valid. principles. 
Three  kinds  of observable  facts  are  taken  as  indicative 
for  the  existence of a  dimension  as  a  basis  for  comparison: 
VARIATION,  IMPLICATION,  and  SQUISHINESS  (GRADIENCE).  They 
he·lp  us  to grasp  the  proper invariant  dimension  of which 
they  are manifestations.  Variation,  implicational relation-
ships  and  squishes tell us  something  ab  out  linguistic acti-
vity,  i..~.  !lwhat  speakers  dO'I,  anel  about  the  tasks  01'  verbal 
activity;  and  once  these  are  r ecognized  we  will Ls  a  signi-
fic ~ nt step  closer  to  the  tertium  comparationis  of linguistic 
comparison. 
2.  Experiencing  t he  Dimension  of Determination in Modern 
Standard  Ger m2n 
My  exploration will take  the  following methodological 
steps:  experience  - recognition  - theory  (formalisation). 
That  is, the  dimensions  I  am  looking  for  can  be  experienced 
by  'working  on'  actual  language  material.  They  belong to 
the  intuitive  'tacit knowledge'  of  a  native  speaker;  but it 
is precisely for  this reason that  they  cannot  be  posited 
beforehand.  Deductive  method will obscure  - rather than il- . 
luminate  - the  speaker's  and  the  linguist~s pre-theoretical 
kno~Nledge  . 
2.1.  Range  of Facts 
Since  we  are in theexploratory stage at this point, 
our  t,erminology regarding determination will admittedly  be 
imprecise.  An  attcmpt  to  introduce  a  more  precise termino-
logy will be  made  in chapter  3. - 5  -
.  For different  linguists the  range  of application of the 
term determination differs  considerably.  Normally,  determin-
ation is understood  as  nominal  determination.  Here  I  must 
set  aside  the  question whether it makes  sense  to  speak  of 
verbal determination.  There  is also  some  agreement  that  a 
core  group  of determiners  consists of demonstratives  and 
articles.  Such  terms  as  pre- and  postdeterminer evidently 
widen  the  scope  of facts.  Where  this  seems  helpful,  I  will 
distinguish  between  determiners  in the  stricter sense  and 
'determiners'  (marked  by  quotes)  in the  wider  sense. 
In  the  following  sections  I  shall endeavor to  show  that 
the  range  of facts  to  be  covered  by  the  term of  'determina-
tion'  is not  only  wider  than is  commonly  assumed  but  also 
that  considerable differentiation must  be  made  within the 
above-mentioned  classes. 
For the  purpose  of orientation  I  offer the  fOllowing, 
somewhat  stilted example,  which  contains  a  maximum  number 
of different  determinators: 
(1)  alle diese meine  erwähnten  zehn  schönen  roten 
die 
hölzernen  Kugeln,  die  ich dir jetzt gebe 
[=  all these  my  afore-mentioned ten pretty red wooden 
the 
balls  on  the  table,  which  I  am  nöw'eiving to you] 
Note  that  numerals  (zehn),  quantifiers  (~)  and  different 
kinds  of adjectives  (schön,rot,  hölzern)  are  being regarded 
as  belonging to the  dimension  of determination.  Most  deter-
miners  normally precede  the  head-noun.  Prepositional at-
tributes  and  relative clauses must  follow  the  noun.  It is 
presupposed  that  the  order of determiners  given  in  (1)  is 
the  normal,  unmarked  one. 
Three  major  types  of constituent  structure are possible 
within  the  sequence  of determiners  (D1,  D2,  . . . ,  Dn )  and 
head-noun  (N): - 6  -
()  11  1  . .  t'  1 )  a  para  e  or  cooralna  lng 
D2  D1  N 
t 
(1') rote,  hölzerne  Kugeln 
(b)  progressive  sUbordination,  starting with  N 
N 
(1") rote  hölzerne  Kulgeln 
(e)  subordination  arnong  determiners 
(i)  N 
t 
(1' ") Kugeln  in der Schachtel,  die  ich dir jetzt gebe 
(ii)  N 
(1"") drei  cm  dicke  Kugeln 
Structure  (b)  epitomizes  our  so-called dimension  of deter-
mination.  This  means  that  an  N is first  determined  by  D1, 
and  this construction in turn is determined  by  D2,  the  com-
plex  construction being further determined  by  D3,  etc. 
Let  us  now  exarnine  the  various  classes  of determiners, 
especially the  ones  preceding the  N.  Special  a~tention will 
be  paid to phenomena  involving variation,  implication,  and 
squishiness.  From  these  we  shall try to  extrapolate  the  par-
ticular function  or functions  involved,  which,in  turn,  will 
help  us  to  elucidate the  nature  of the  dimension  of deter-
mination. 
There  is  one  basic regularity,  however,  which  holds 
for all the determiners  with regard  to their head  noun  in 
the  sequenceof  (1): 
(R1)(i)  The  ranga  of  ~pplication of a  determiner-D  to 
possible  head  nouns  increases proportionally with 
its positional distance  from  N. 
1)  On  thc  probl~ms of  parallel constituency of determiners 
ee  S8iler  (1960: 1('). - 7  -
Thus,  in our  example  D1  = hölzern  (wooden)  applies  to  a 
smaller number  of possible  Ns,  vize  to those  characterized 
by  the  feature  [+  solid objectJ,  whereas  D2  = ~  (red)  ap-
plies to more  possible  Ns,  vize  to those  with the  features 
[+  solid object]  or [- solid object).  Again,  there  are more 
nominal  not  ions  which  are potentially  schön  (nice,  pretty, 
beautiful)  than  there  are notions  potentially rot  (red); 
the  countable  notions(zehn  (ten)]outnumber  those  being po-
tentially  'pretty', the'aforementioned'  ones  (erwähnten) 
outnumber  the  'countable';  the  things  which  are potentially 
'mine'  (meine)  outnumber  the  'aforementioned'  ones,  things 
deictically pointed at  and  being  close  to  the apeaker 
(diese)  outnumber  things  potentially  'mine',  and alle  (all) 
seems  to  be  all-inclusive  and  to  outnumber  everything else. 
There .is another regularity  concomitant  to  (R1)(i): 
If a  determiner  Dnj  has  wider  application than  a  determiner 
Dni'  its force  or potential of singling out  from  the  total-
ity of objects  the  one  that  the  speaker wants  to refer to 
is increased.  Hence,  we  formulate  the  concomitant  regularity: 
(R1)(ii) The  potential of  a  determiner  D for  singling out 
the  object referred to  by  the  head  noun  N increases 
proportionally with  the  positional distance of D 
from  N. 
2.2.  Material  Adjectives  and  Color Adjectives 
In  common  grammatical practice both are  subsumed  under 
the  term  and  notion of  'descriptive adjectives'.  However, 
we  have  evidence  for their belonging to  two  distinct  classes. 
Differences  become  apparent  in word  order.  The  normal  order 
is: 
(2)  rote hölzerne  Kugeln 
It  conveys  the  idea that  among  all possible balls in the 
universe  of discourse  the  speaker wants  to  single  out  the - 8  -
wooden  ones,  and  that  among  all possible balls in the uni-
verse  of discourse  the  speaker  wants  to  single  out  those 
which  are  red.  Now,  with variation we  get  the  word  order 
(3)  hölzerne rote  Kugeln 
This  order is marked.  It conveys  contrastive  ideas either 
in the  sense  that  'wooden'  is opposed  to  some  other material 
(~.~.  eisern  'iron')  or  in the  sense  that  'red'  is opposed 
to  some  other  color  (~.~.  blau  'blue'). 
What  does  this variation in form  and  meaning  show  us? 
The  semaotic  structure of  Kugeln  qua  solid objects naturally 
implies material constitution of  some  sort; it implies  -
with  a  lesser degree  of naturalness  - some  property  in the 
color spectrum.  To  this gradient  decrease  in natural  seman-
tic implication corresponds  the  normal  word  crder in which  the 
'determiner'  with the  strongly  implied property is closer 
to  the  head  noun  than the  'determiner'  with the  less  strong-
ly  implied property.  If the natural order is reversed,  we 
obtain an  emphasis  placed  on either one  or the  other property. 
An  empirical correlate of naturalness  in implication 
can  be  seen  in the  following  relationship: 
(4)  (i)  hölzerne  Kugeln 
(ii) rote  Kugeln 
Holzkugeln 
- ~otkugeln 
From  this we  learn that  there  are  constraints in composition 
which  seem  to  be  due  to  semantic  factors  rat  her than  to mor-
pho-syntactic  patterning.  I  shall return to the  sUbject 
below. 
Gradient decrease  in naturalness  of semantic  implication 
of properties  by  a  head  noun,  which  is suggested  by  these 
data,  and  whi~h is claimed to  be  an  all-pervasive principle 
in the  serialisation as exemplified in  (1)  is, evidently, 
the  converse  of  (R1).  We  may  formulate  this as  folIows: - 9  -
(R  2)  'Determiners'  indicate properties  implied in the  concept 
represented  by  the head  noun.  The  degree  of naturalness 
of  such  an  implication of  Dni  vs.  Dnj  decreases  proportio~ 
nally to  the distance of Dn.  vs.  Dn.  with  regard to  1.  J 
the  head  noun. 
While  R1  corresponds  to  the principle of extension,  R2 
r'nor.responds  to the  principle  of  intension.  It iS:l  in G.  Frege  I s 
(1892/1962:64ff.)  terms  the  diChotomy  between  the  CONCEPT 
(Begriff)  (R2)  with its Gorrelated  notions  of  PREDICATE  and 
PROPERTY,  and  the  OBJECT  (Gegenstand)  with  REFERENCE,  INDIVIDUAL 
or  CLASS  as  correlated notions. 2  It seems  to be  generally 
assumed  that  CONCEPT  and  OBJECT  are  two  diametricallY  opposed 
poles  where  no  in-between is possible.  An  important  point 
which  I  should  like to drive  horne  is that  in the  sequence  of 
'determiners'  as  presented in  (1)  there is indeed  a  continuum 
from  CONCEPT  to  REFERENCE  and,  conversely,  from  REFERENCE  to · 
CONCEPT.  Moreover,  I  should  like  to point  out  that  each 
'determiner'  in the  sequence participates in or contributes  to 
both principles  in different  degrees:  The  more  widely  a 
'determiner'  is applicable  to  a  head  noun  (R1),  the  more  it 
contributes  to determining  the  REFERENCE  and  the  less it 
contributes  to determining  the  COMCEPT  of  the  head  noun  (R2). 
The  less widely  applicable  a  'determiner',  the  less it contributes 
to REFERENCE  (R1),  and  the more it contributes  to identifying the 
CONCEPT  (R2), explicating,  as it were,  its inherent  PROPERTIES. 
The  foundation  of these  views  will  now  have  to be  tested by 
examining  the  subsequent  determiners. 
2.3.  Evaluating adjectives  and  affective adjectives 
Evaluating adjectives  come  in antonymic  pairs  like 
schön  (ex.  (1»  - häßlich,  groß  - klein, ~  - reich.  They 
2  I  .  .  am  1.ndebted to Dr.  H.  van  den  Boom:;  Mr.  G.  Brettschneider, 
and  Dr~ E.  Holen~tein:l with whom  I  discussed problemsregarding 
extension  and  intension. - 10  -
typically  show  gradation.  They  are  also typically  connected 
with  the  speech-act,  for it is the  speaker  who  does  the 
evaluation according to his  own  views:  wh at  speaker X 
finds  beautiful may  seem  ugly  to speaker  Y. 
In  normal~  unmarked  word  order evaluating adjectives 
precede  the  color adjectives,  in other words:  they  surpass 
th~ color adjectives  by  one  digit in positional distance 
with  regard to the  head  noun: 
(5)  (i)  schöne rote hölzerne  Kugeln 
If this  order is changed,  we  get  sequences  of questionable 
acceptability: 
(ii)  (?)  rote schöne  hölzerne  Kugeln 
(iii)  (?)  rote hölzerne  schöne  Kugeln 
The  sequences  become  acceptable if the  evaluating adjective 
is separated  from  the  other adjective  by  a  pause: 
(iv)  rote,  schöne,  hölzerne  Kugeln 
(v)  rote hölzerne,  schöne,  Kugeln 
But  then the evaluating adjective is no  longer  a  subordinated 
one  but  rather  a  parallel constituent vis-a-vis the  other 
determiners. 
If our interpretation of  (R1)  and  (R2)  as  given in 2.2. 
is correct,  we  should  expect  that  evaluating adjectives  sur-
pass  color  and  material  adjectives  in distance with respect 
to N because  their specificatory function  (i.e.  the  function 
which  determines  reference  or extension)  outweighs  their 
characterizing function  (i.e.  the function  which  determines 
properties  of the  concept  or intension) .  This is indeed  the - 11  -
case,  and it is understandable why  this  should be  so: 
Identification of  referents is fundamentally  linked to the 
individual speech-act.  Evaluating adjectives  are 3  in some 
sense,  connected  with the  speaker  and  thus  with  th~ speech-
act.  There is agreement  between  the  two  statements. 
Affective adjectives  like wunderbar  'marvelous' 
scheußlich  'dreadful',  blöd  'stupid'  are  even  more  intimately  -
involved with the  speaker  and  the  speech-act  than  the 
evaluating ones.  They  usually  lack  antoyms,  and  they  also 
lack gradation.  For  the  choice  of  a  particular adjective, 
the presence  of  both antonyms  and  gradation in the  evaluating 
adjectives  seems  to guarantee  a  certain independence  with re-
spect  to the  speaker  and  speech-act,  an  independence  not 
guaranteed in the  affective adjectives:  There  are  probably  more 
people  who  would  agree  on  which  side  of the  dichotomy  la~g 
, long'  - kurz  i short'  an'  obj ect  should  be  classified,  the  more  so 
since evaluation presupposes  certain accepted  standards. 
Correspondingly  there  are  less people  who  would  agree  that 
something  or  someone 1s  simply  istupid'. 
Affective adjectives  can  be  homonymous  with evaluating 
ones,  e.  g. ~  1 poor'.  Yet  they ,are  ~ distinct. class,and in normal 
order  they  precede  the  evaluating  ones: 
(6)  (i)  armes  reiches  Land!  ' poor rich country' 
This  is not  a  contradiction precisely because there are  two 
different positional  classes.  In contradistinction to reich, 
~  is affective and  endearing,  being  outside the  domain  of 
material wealth.  If we  invert  the  order: 
(ii) reiches  armes  Land! 
reich is the  adj ective removed  fre.m  the  domain  of material 
wealth;  it thus  assumes  some  such  component  as  'rich in 
spiritual values' .  The  principles  (R1)  and  (R2)  and  our inter-
pretation thereof  are thus  confirmed. - 12  -
2.4.  Numerals 
The  Janus-like  nature  of  'determiners'  vis-a-vis  the 
two  principles  of "extension  (R1)  and  intension  (R2)  is 
particularly apparent  with  respect  to numerals  (cardinals  and 
ordinals).  They  are  concerned with intension and  thus reflect 
qualities inherent  in N,  which  must  be  [+ Count]  .  In  some 
instances  they  also agree in case  inflection: 
(7)  Zweier  schöner hölzerner roter Kugeln 
On  the other hand,  determination of  N by  means  of  a  numeral 
g  has  the effect of  IIsorting out
li  sub~total:  of gN,  and  hence 
of contributing to  the identification of referents. 
It is  important  that variation contributes  to the  con-
firmation of this analysis.  We  have  normal  word  order,  which is 
(8)  Ci)  Zehn  schöne  hölzerne rote Kugeln 
with  the  numeral distance  of the numeral  surpassing that  of 
the  evaluating  (  and  the affective)adjectives.  We  have  marked 
orders  such  as 
(ii)  schöne  zehn hölzerne rote  Kugeln 
which,for  some  speakers,have a  slightly  contrastive 
function implying that in contradistinction to the  'pretty 
ten  .~.  balls'  there might  be  others  not  pretty.  We  also 
find 
( ...  ) 
1.1.1.  schöne  hölzerne rote  zehn  Kugeln 
which  suggests  an  almost  indi~soluble unity between  n  and  N, 
as  if they  expressed  one  single  concept.  The  fOllowing 
example  is even more  illustrative: 
(9)  Ci)  die heiligen drei  Könige  =[tthe  (three)  Magi'  or 
tthe  (three)  wis~ men  from  the EasttJ 
(ii)  die drei heiligen  Könige  ' the  three holy  kings' - 13  -
In  (i)  ~ and  N are  almost  like members  of  a  compound.  In 
fact  we  find  numerous  compounds  showing  Dreikönig  (s)- as 
a  first  member.  It is typical for  composition that  the  meaning 
of the total is narrowed  down  vis-ä-vis  the  addition of the 
meanings  of the  constituent parts.  The  numeral  'three'  is 
indeed  an  integrated  component  of the  notion of  'the Magi' 
in German 3  and,  consequently,  has  its position right  next 
to the  noun.  In  contradistinction,  (iii)  would  refer to 
any  'holy  kings'  which  happen  to be three in number  but  for 
which  'three-ness'  is not  essential. 
As  before  (see  2.2.),  we  attack the  problem  of the role 
and  position of  compounds  within the  dimension  of  determination. 
There  are  obviously constraints but  also favoritisms  in the 
productivity of  compound  formation~ which  cannot  be  explained 
on  the basis  of conventional morpho-syntactic  considerations, 
but  for  which  the regularities  as  outlined here  offer  an 
intelligible rationale.  We  cannot  delve  into this question, 
which  certainly deserves  more  thorough  investigation. 
2.5.  Participial anaphoric  adjectives 
I  have  in mind  such adjectives  as  bekannt  'known', 
genannt  'mentioned',  (vor-)erwähnt  '(previously)  mentioned'. 
They  explicitly refer to what  is known  or has  been mentioned 
before the  time  of the  speech-act  and  thus it seems  natural 
that  their potential for  'pinning down'  a  referent  is rather 
high.  Accordingly,  they  precede the  numeral  in normal  word 
order: 
(10)  erwähnte  zehn  schöne  hölzerne rote  Kugeln 
2.6.  'The  turning point' 
We  now  come  to  a  point  in the  continuum  of  'determiners' 
where  several things  change.  The  participial adjectives  of  2.5. 
can be  preceded  by  the article  (definite or indefinite)  or - 14  -
the  possessive pronoun  - which  seem  to belong  into the  same 
position class  but  which  certainly differ in function.  Still 
more  retracted positions  can  be filled by  demonstrative 
pronouns,  quantifiers,  and,  eventually,  adverbials.  By  and  large, 
these  constitute the  group  of  determiners  in the  more  restricted 
sense.  There is evidence  that the principles  (R1)  and  (R2) 
and  their interpretation as  outlined in 2.2.  also hold for 
them  (see  below).  Thus,  the difference must  not mislead us  to 
overlooking the  common  principles.  The  elements  just mentioned 
d~ffer from  the  elements  treated in the  preceding sections 
mainly  in two  respects: 
1.  They  do  not  admit  positional variation,  neither  among 
themselves  (e.g. ~meine diese ...  ,*diese alle ..• ), nor 
with respect  to the preceding elements  (e.g. *  zehn die ....  , 
~ .  h "  d'  t  )  sc  one  lese ...  ,  e  c .. 
2.  They  do  not  admit  relativization.  Relativization is possible 
as  a  variant  of  'determiners'  discussed so far. 
Compare 
(11)  hölzerne  Kugeln - Kugeln 3  die  hölzern sind 
(12)  schöne  Kugeln  - Kug e ln~  die  schön  sind 
(13)  zehn  Kugeln  - (?)  Kugeln,  die  zehn  sind 
(14)  meine  Kugeln  - ( ?)  Kugeln,  die meine  sind 
Kugeln,  die  mein  sind 
(15)  die  Kugeln  - * Kugeln,  die die  sind 
(16)  diese  Kugeln 
~  die diese  sind  - Kugeln) 
(17)  alle Kugeln 
~  Kugeln,  die alle sind 
Looking  at  the acceptability of  these  sequences  there is  a 
transitional  zone  in the  numeral  and  possessive positions 
indicated by  quest  ion marks  and  the  existence cf similar 
alternative constructions.  Outside this  zone,  things  are quite 
clear.  This  means  that  Ideterminers'  in the wider  sense  can  be 
predicated,  while  cieterminersin the  narrower  sense  cannot.  The - 15  -
existence  of  a  transitional  zone  is just  one  of several 
instances  of  'local squishiness'  (for another  instance 
see  2.7.)  which  corresponds  to the over-all  continuum 
as  formulated  in  (R
1
)  and  (R2). 
Variation is  one  of the  phenomena  which  I  take  as  in-
dicative for  a  behavioral-cognitive function  and  a  correspond-
ing dimension  of language  structure,  the  other  two  being  im-
plication and  squishiness.  If (positional)  variation is ex-
cluded for  determiners  in the  narrower  sense,  we  find,  in-
stead,  implicational relations  and  local squishiness. 
It is interesting that  implications  may  go  in  two  di-
rections  indicated by  (R1 )' and  (R2).  Thus,  considering  (R1 ) 
we  might  say:  To  the  extent that  reference is determined 
by  a  demonstrative  (dieser  'this') it can  also  be  de-
termined  by  the  definite article  (der  'the'),  although  the 
reverse  i8  not  true.  In  comparison with the definite article 
the  demotistrative  effectuates  a  further narrowing  down  of 
reference  by  singling out  the  objects  in the  speaker's 
proximity.  On  the  other hand,  considering  (R2)  we  might  say: 
By  virtue  of its opposition to  the  indefinite  (ein  'al)  the 
definite article introduces  some  such  component  as  'pre-
supposed  to be  identifiable by  the  hearer'  (see  below 2.7.), 
not  present  in the  demonstrative.  It is this relationship which 
is probably  intended  by  the  somewhat  cryptic  formulation 
(11the  article influences  the  noun  somehow  from  the  inside,  that 
is to  say it influences  the  noun  in its very  essence,  whereas 
the  demonstrative  pronoun merely  points  from  outside without 
sUbstantially affecting the  noun
ll
)  in J.  Kr~msk~'s monograph 
on  the  article  (Krämsk~ 1972:33)3. 
3Cf.  also  V.  Mathesius'  !lertinent  remark  cited in  Kr~msk~, 
l.c.:  "A  genuine  articl(.;  may  be  spoken  of  only  when  its use 
results  from  the  meanin(;  of the  noun  itself •..  ".  Mathesius 
recognized  the  important:  intensional  (R2)  aspect  in the 
article. - 16  -
2.7.  Articles 
To  deal  with the  numerous  problems  connected  with  the 
different kinds  of articles adequately is  a  task far  beyond 
the  scope  of this paper.  I  should  like to refer to  the  im-
portant  monograph  just cited  (Kramsky  1972),  an  illuminating 
study  by  N.  Burton-Roberts  (1976),  and  two  mimeographed  papers 
by  B.  Comrie  (1976a  and  1976b)  concerned with definiteness. 
All  I  can  do  here  is to  point  out  in  a  number  of succinct 
statements  the  particular position of articles within the 
dimension  we  are exploring. 
1.  The  fact  that  in the  determinative  sequence  of German 
(our  ex.  (1»  the article has  its  positio~ exactly at  the 
'turning point'  (see  2.6.) must  be  stressed.  The  reasons  for 
the  original  coinage  of the  term  (Greek  arthron  'joint; 
connecting word')  by  Graeco-Roman  grammarians  are  not  clear. 
And  evidence  from  Modern  Standard German  may  be  linked to 
this  only  way  of  a  universal principle which  we  still hope 
to discover.  Yet,  it is significant in this context  that  the 
German  article  does  have  a  linking function  in many  respects 
(see  the  following points). 
2.  The  function  commonly  attributed to  the article is 
definiteness.  Neither  in German  - nor  in other  languages  - is 
the  article the  only  definiteness marker.  Definiteness  should 
not  be  equated with deixis.  It is true that deixis  is a  'source 
of reference'  (cf.  Lyons  1974),  but it is not  the  only  one. 
Genetically articles have  evolved  from  former  deictic  elements 
such  as  demonstrative  pronouns.  But  it is mistaken to regard 
in the article as  'nothing but'  a  weakened  deictic. 
3.  In  German  there  is the  contrast  between  the  definite 
and  indefinite article,  or,  functionally  speaking,  between 
definiteness  and  indefiniteness.  It is usually  linked to the 
notions  of  'what  is kno'Wn/unknown'  01'  'has  been/has  not  been 
previously mentioned'.  Comrie's  studies  (1976a,b)  indicate 
that  things  are  much  more  complex  than that.  Both in English - 17  -
and  in German  definite vs.  indefinite article bring into play 
a  pragmatic  dimension  of conversational interaction where 
lithe  hearer will  try to  identify the referents  of  the  noun 
phrases  in the  speaker' s  utterance  11  and  '\'oThere  "the  speaker' s 
utterance will therefore  contain various  clues  telling the 
hearer  how  to set  about  solving the  referent  identification 
problem .•• 
1i  (op.cit.15).  Comrie  goes  to  say  that  I1definiteness 
is just one,  extreme,  instance  of this:  by  using adefinite 
noun  phrase,  in an  absolute  sense  11  (loc. ci  t. ).  Fr.om  these  and 
ensuing discussions  we  learn that  there  is reason for  assuming 
'definiteness'  in a  wider  sense  in which  there is not  an 
absolute  contrast  between  'identifiable'  vs.  'not  identifiable', 
but  rather ascale of relatively greater or lesser identifia-
bility.  Comrie's  examples  - which  could  also  be  copied in 
German  - are: 
(13)  Fred  was  looking for  a  book 
This  is  ,unbiguous  as  to identifiability,  depending  on  whether 
it can  be  continued with 
(i)  but  he  did  not  find it  or 
(ii)  but  he  did  not  find  one 
In  the first reading,  there is a  specific  book  that Fred 
was  trying to find,  in the  second reading,  any  book  would 
satisfy the  quest.  It looks  as  if within the  overall range 
of  'determination'  with its phenomena  of transition and 
squishiness  the articles constituted  a  subdomain with its 
own,  or  le ~sl ,  squishiness. 
4.  Fer  both  the definite and  the  indefinite article there 
is  a  generic vs.  a  specific use,  which  complicates  the  problem 
considerably.  Burton-Roberts  (1976:442f.)  have  convincingly 
shown  that  the  semantic  distinction between  generic definite 
vs.  generic  indefinite is a  contrast  between  the  class itself, 
hence,in Frege's  sense,  an  OBJECT,  and  what  constitutes member-
ship  of the  class,  hence  a  CONCEPT.  His  examples: - 18  -
(14)  A whale  is  a  mammal:  predicates  'mammalness'  of 
'whaleness' 
(15)  The  whale  is  a  mammal:  predicates  'mammalness' 
of the  class whale. 
Once  more,  we  find  in this  contrast  our  two  converse 
principles  of extensionality  (R1)  and  intensionality  (R2) 
respectively. 
5.  It is often  claimed  that  the  indefinite article in 
German  - as  weIl  as  in English  - is essentially the  numeral 
'one'  (see,  e.g.,  Moravcsik  1969:88).  Again,  we  must  reject 
the  identification.  True,  there  are  good  arguments  for  the 
generic  derivation of the  indefinite article  from  the  numeral 
'one'  in many  languages.  But  the  functional  contrast  hinted at 
in points  3.  and  4.  are  outside  the  domain  of numerals. 
2.8.  P o~-,:  ::';'3 s i ve  pronouns 
They  f ollow the  demonstrative  and  precede  the  numeral. 
Their  pct ential of referential fixation resides  in their 
connecting  the  concept  expressed  by  the  head  noun  to  the 
speaker  or  the  addressee  or  a  third person designated  by  the 
speaker  (see  Seiler 1973:231f.). 
2.9.  Demc 2.~"::: rati  ve  pronouns 
Thei:"  fixation potential resides  in their directly 
localizi!,_ ",  "':;118  obj ect  denoted  by  the  head  noun  as  being ei  ther 
in proxir:':: ty of  the  speaker:  dieser  (hier),  or at  a  distance: 
j ener  ( :j "(~E: "~ ) ' 
Demonstratives  and  articles may  co-occur,  but  only  in an 
appositional  construction: 
(16)  diese,  die  genannten  zehn  schönen roten Kugeln - 19  -
2.10.  Quantifiers 
I  have  in mind  the  element  alle  'i all'  and"  eventually 
the related elements  einige  'sorne',  keine  'none  of  ... ', 
viele  fmany',  welche  'which  Ohes'.  While  alle fits  into 
the  sequence  wi thout  compli.cation  ~  the  others  can  only  appear 
in that position by  using  a  genetive  construction: 
(17)  einige  (keine,  viele,  welche)  dieser  zehn ... Kugeln 
Logically,  we  would  expect the  re~erence of  a  noun 
determined  by  alle or keine  to be  entirely  and  unequivocally 
established.  Additional  reinforcement  of the  fixation potential 
is brought  about  by  letting the quantifier be  preceded by 
such adverbials  as ~  'only', wirklich  'verY';J  genau 
'exactly'.  The  last mentioned  is very  popular,  particularly 
in casual  speech.  It is as if, at  least potentially,  the 
sequence  of  'fixators'  of reference  could  be  continued 
without  an end. 
2.11.  Postponed  determiners 
I  shall say  nothing here  about  prepositional attributes 
(e.g.  auf dem  Tisch  'on  the table'),  nor  about  relative 
clauses.  Appositions  can either precede  or  follow  the  noun. 
Significantly, their position is right  next  to N.  But  I  shall 
not  go  into this  any  further.  Genetives mayaIso  follow  the  N. 
However"  if they  precede  N,  their position must  be  that  of 
the possessive  pronouns. - 20  -
3.  Elements  of  a  Theory 
We  have  now  exper  ienced  and  formulated  some  regularities 
involving variation,  implication,  and  continuum  or  squishiness, 
which  point  to  ceO rtain communicative  tasks  and  which  suggest 
the  existence  of  a  particular dimension  of  language  structure 
as  well  as  appropriate principles for fullfilling these tasks. 
The  exploration has  been  carried out  within  one  language;  it 
has  been  a  survey rat  her  thana complete description,  and 
many  details  need  further elaboration:  It is therefore 
premature  to  attempt  a  theory  accounting  for  the  facts 
observed,  let alone  to  give  a  formalized  theory.  In the 
fOllowing,  I  shall try  to furnish  a  few  elements  which  are 
needed  for  the  construction of such  a  theory. 
First of all,  I  propose  the  following  terminological 
conventions : 
1.  Determination  I  use  as  the  name  of that  particular 
dimension of  language  structure which  is concerned with 
the  tasks  of  specifying reference  on  the  one  hand,  and 
with  characterizing  a  concept  on  the other,  and  which o 
encompasses  such  phenomena  as  described  in  2 ~ 1  - 2.11. 
2.  Specification  I  use  as  the  name  for  the principle tenta-
tively formulated  as  (R1)  which  corresponds  to the task of 
identifying reference.  The  principle  lo S  manifested  by 
different attributive classes which differ in their potential 
for establishi ng  reference  - from  weak  to strong.  In  German 
they  are  formally  marked  by  word  order regularities . 
Specification is thus  determination of reference. 
3.  Oharacterization  I  use  as  the  name  for the  principle 
tentative~y formulated  as  (R2),  which  corresponds  to  the tasks 
of explicating the properties  of  a  concept.  The  principle - 21  -
is manifested  by  the  same  attributive classes  as in2. with 
a  potential for  predicationg properties  which  is inversely 
proportional to  their reference  identification potential. 
Characterization is  thus  determination of  a  concept. 
The  terms  of  specification and  characterization  I  have 
used  asearly as  1960  (Seiler 1960:19)  to distinguish between 
essentially the  same  phenomena  with special reference  to 
restrictive vs.  non-restrictive relative  clauses. 
4.  Definite,  definiteness  I  use  as  the  name  for  that par-
ticular function within the  dimension  of determination which 
has  to  do  with the  communicative  interaction between  speaker 
and  hearer relative to  the  task of reference  identification. 
As  apreparatory step for constructing a  model  of my 
view  on  the  dimension  of determination  - which  I  consider 
to  be  a  task for  the  future  - I  will try to characterize the 
understanding  of determination as it is hitherto prevalent 
in the  linguistic and  in  some  of the  philosophical literature. 
There  is  a  view  according to which  the main  purpose for  which 
we  use  language  is the  purpose  of  stating facts  about  things 
and  persons  and  events:  "If we  want  to fulfill this purpose,  we 
must  have  some  way  of forestalling  the  question  ''vJhat  (who, 
which  one)  are  you  talking about?'  as  weIl  as  the question, 
'What  are  you  saying  about  it  (hirn,  her)?'"  (Strawson  1950/ 
1963:181).  The  task of forestalling the first question is 
the referring  (or identifying)  task.  The  linguistic means 
used  in fulfilling this task are  called determiners,  deter-
mination.  The  task of forestalling the  second question is what 
linguists call the predicative task  and  what  some  philoso-
phers  (e.g.  Strawson,  loc.  cit.) call the attributive  (or 
descriptive or classificatory or ascriptive)  task.  Now, 
according to the  common  view  the  performance  of these  two 
tasks  can be  assigned  to  separable  expressions:  It is held - 22  -
that  a  linguistic entity  cannot  simultaneously  be  attributive 
and referential  (see,  e.g.  Burton-Roberts  1976:429).  Tru-
betzkoy  (1939:133)  sharply distinguishes  between  'syntagmes 
determinatifs',  'syntagme  sujet  +  predicat',  and  'syntagmes 
sociatifs'  as  the  three major  types  of  syntactic relations. 
It is generally  assumed  that  linguistic elenlents  are  spe-
cialized in serving either a  referring or  a  predicative 
function.  It is said that  proper  names  are  uniquely referring 
and  that deictic  elements  (locatives,  demonstrative  pronouns, 
articles)  are  the  linguistic means  to specify reference. 
This  is what  I  would  call a  reificational view.  It regards 
categories  and  relations  (such as  determination)  as if they 
were  things,  as if they  were  not  only  distinguishable  but 
also neatly  separable.  As  far  as  linguistics is concerned, 
two  major difficulties arise  from  such  a  view:  The  first 
concerns  the definition and  delimination of linguistic cate-
gories  and  relations.  How  should  we  define determination?  No 
satisfactory answer  has  been  found  to  this question as  yet. 
Should  we  include  or exclude  adjective,  genitive,  and  relative 
constructions,  the article, etc.? Obviously,  if we  say rote 
Kugeln  'red balls', we  mean  a  restricted set,  and  if we  say 
diese  Kugeln  'these balls',  we  also  mean  a  restricted set. 
There  is  a  common  functional  denominator  which  linguists  have 
intuitively feIt.  But  should  the  adjective  be  called a  deter-
minator?  The  other major  diffuculty arising  from  a  reifica-
tional  view  concerns  the  comparison of  language  specific 
phenomena.  Suppose  we  decided  to define  determination as 
those regularities of serialization which  are  found  in Modern 
Standard  German?  But  there  are  languages  where  very little or 
no  corresponding  word  order regularities  can  be  found.  We  are 
then left with  Kramsky's  dilemma  (see  above,  1.):  Define  de-
termination with precision in only  one  language,  or vaguely 
in many  languages. - 23  -
How  would  a  'dimensional'  view  as  intuitionistically 
applied  in chapter  2  differ  from  the  'reificational'  view 
as  characterized above?  I  shall briefly discuss  the 
fOllowing  points: 
1.  I  am  interested above  all in the  functional  aspect.  But 
how  can this  be  done?  What  is known  about  language  functions? 
We  can,  as  we  did  in chapter  2,  observe  regularities  concerning 
variation,  implication,  and  continuum.  They  have  proven to  be 
remarkably  consistent.  This  provides  assurance  of  some  basic 
principles at work  - the' ones  which  I  have  called,  respectively, 
specification and  characterization.  It turned  out  that  they 
are  not  independent  but  stand in a  converse  relationship to 
each  other.  This  complementarity,  then,  has  led me  to positing 
a  common  dimension  which  I  call determination. 
2.  Distinction  - yes,  separation  - no.  In German  the  dimension 
of determination happens  to  be  rather neatly manifested in 
sequential order.  There  are  position classes  which  are distin-
guished  by  special regularities.  But  the regularities  always 
point  in either the direction of characterization or that  of 
specification.  There  is also  a  Jturning point'. Essentially, it 
is the  point  from  which  determiners  cannot  be  relativized, i.e. 
cannot  be  predicated any  more.  There  is  an  intrinsic  connexion 
among  the  intensional aspects  of a  concept  and  characterization 
and  predication  (see  2.2.).  This  connexion  would  be  further 
substantiated if we  took  apposition into account.  Apposition 
is predominantly  intensi on~l,and it has  strong affinities with 
(parenthetic)  predication  (see  Seiler 1960:27f.).  But  in spite 
of the  incision marked  by  the  'turning point',  the  dimension 
does  not  end  there.  It is true that demonstratives  cannot  be 
predicated,  yet  they  are  not  entirely devoid  of properties re-
lated to properties of the  head  noun:  In  German  there  is agree-
ment  in gender,  case,  and  number. 
3.  A further aspect  I  am  strongly interested in could  be 
called  'constructivism'.  The  'dimensional'  view  should  account 
for  what  spE:akers  do.  This  is not  to  be  confounded  with prag-- 24  -
matics,  at  least not  in the  sense  of  'naming  ships'  and  'making 
promises'.  But  speakers  do  construct  the  reference  of  a  concept 
by  singling it out  from  different perspectives  such  as  material 
constituency,  evaluation,  number-set,  location,  etc.  Philo-
sophers  since  the  Middle  Ages  have  said that  the  i~dividual 
is  ineffable  (individuum est ineffabile),4  and, indeed,  we  have 
seen that  referent identification could  in principle  be  an 
endless  task.  To  make  it finite,  the  context is a  decisive 
factor.  Concomitantly with referent identification the  speaker 
also  constructs  an  intensionalityspectrum of the  concept. 
This is closely akin  to  the  principle of descriptivity ex-
plained  elsewhere  (Seiler 1975:2ff.). 
4.  The  dimension  of determination  in interlinguistic  comparison 
The  motivation for  introducing  the  - perhaps  - new  con-
cept  of dimension  and  the related concept  of principles  sterns 
from  ongoing research in language  universals  and  in particular 
from  the  conviction that  the  bases  and  goals  of nongenetic  inter-
linguistic  comparison has  so  far  remained  in the  dark.  It re-
mains  to  be  tested whether  the  concepts  introduced  here  can  shed 
light  on  the  problem. 
In  what  sense  can  the  dimension  and  the  principles 
lay  claim to universal validity?  I  hasten to point  out 
that  I  do  not  claim universality  for  any  of  the  'things'  found 
in thc  determinative  constructions  of German:  Neither  for  the 
prcperties  cf serialization,  although similar properties  are 
found  in  2  great  many  languages,  nor  for position classes  and 
their properties,  although as  classes  they  seem  to  have  a  very 
wide  range  of application.  It is rat  her  the  concurrence  of these 
different  factors  with respect  to  a  fairly  clear purpose:  that 
of referent  identification. 
41  am  indebted to  Dr.  1:.  van  den  Boom  for  bringing this to 
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matics,  at  least not  in the  sense  of  'naming  ships'  and  'making 
promisesv.  But  speakers  do  construct  the  reference  of a  concept 
by  singling it out  from  different perspectives  such  as  material 
constituency,  evaluation,  nQmber-set,  location,  etc.  Philo-
sophers  since  the. Middle  Ages  have  said that  the  individual 
is ineffable  (individuum est ineffabile),4  and  indeed,  we  have 
seen that  referent  identification could  in principle  be  an 
endless  task.  To  make  it finite,  the  context is a  decisive 
factor.  Concomitantly  with referent identification the  speaker 
also  constructs  an  intensionalityspectrum of the  concept. 
This  is closely  akin ·ta the  principle of descriptivity ex-
plained  elsewhere  (Seiler 1975:2ff.). 
4.  The  dimension  of determination  in interlinguistic com2arison 
The  motivation for  introducing the  - perhaps  - new  con-
cept  af dimensi6n  and  the  related  concept  of principles  sterns 
from  ongoing research in language  universals  and  in particular 
from  the  conviction that the  bases  and  goals  of  nongenetic  inter-
linguisti c  comparison has  so  far  remained  in the  dark.  It re-
mains  to  be  tested whether  the  concepts  introduced here  can  shed 
light  on  the  problem. 
In  what  sense  can the  dimension  and  the  principles 
lay  claim to universal validity?  I  hasten to point  out 
that  I  da  not  claim universality  for  any  of the  'things'  found 
in t he  determinative  constructions  of German:  Neither for  the 
properties  of serialization,  although  similar properties  are 
found  1 n  2  great  many  languages,  nor  for position classes  and 
their properties,  although  as  classes  they  seem  to  have  a  very 
wide  range  of application.  1t  i3  rather the  concurrence  of  these 
different  factors  with respect  to  a  fairly  clear purpose:  that 
of referent  identification. 
41  am  indebted to Dr.  H.  van  den  Boom  for  bringing this to 
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In the  following  l  shall give  a  few  hints  on  how  the 
concepts  might  be  used  in interlinguistic  comparison. 
J.  Greenberg  (1963:68f.)  has  formulated  the  following 
"Universal":  "Hhen  any  or all of the  items  (demonstrative, 
numeral,  and  descriptive  adjective)  precede  the  noun,  they 
are  always  found  in that  order.  If they  follow,  the  order is 
either the  same  or its exact  opposite".  This  is  a  striking 
regularity,  but  Greenberg  does  not  further  elaborate  its 
structural nor  functional  significance.  The  statement  which 
includes  both  implication  and  variation,  may  be  charted  as 
follows  (d  = demonstrative,  n  = numeral"  a  = adjective,  N = 
head  noun): 
(18)  all elements  preoede:  d  n  a  N 
all elements  follow:  N a  n  d 
N  d  n  a 
German,  English 
Diegueno,  Swahili,  Kikuyu 
Kikuyu  (less popular 
variant) 
I  do  not  know  what  the  111ess  popular"  variant  of  Kikuyu  is 
supposed  to  connote.  I  suppose  that the  relationship  of  the 
satellites to  the  head  noun  could  be  appositional.  Within 
the  German  sequence  we  found  appositional relationships  when 
the  normal  word  order  was  changed.  Normally  and  even  'uni-
versally'"  the  demonstratives  come  at  the  outer ends  of  such 
sequences,  followed  inwards  by  the  numeral  and  descriptive 
adjectives.  If we  take  'constructivism'  into account,  we  will 
be  in a  position to explain why  this is so:  Reference  of  a 
noun  is construed  by  adding determiners  with  increasing po-
tential for  fixation.  Demonstratives  are  among  the strongest, 
numerals  are  weaker,  adjectives weaker still. Quite  often the 
fixation potential of demonstratives  gets  weakened,  so  they 
turn into articles.  New  and  still stronger demonstratives  (or 
local expressions)have  to  be  added.  Naturally  this progressive 
addition takes  place at  the  'outer ends'  of the  noun  phrase. 
An  interesting case  where  this kind  of  'constructivism' 
is fairly  transparent is presented  by  Sango,  the  lingua-franca (19) . 4 
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of the  Central Afriean  Republie  (Samarin  1967).  Serialization 
and  position elasses,  as  they  appear  from  Samarin's  de-
seription,  may  be  eharted as  folIows: 
3  2  1  HEAD  1  2  3  4 
num. ; 
deser.adj.  descr.adj.  relat.demonstr. 
5 
mbeni  .- mbeni  kete  kete  ..  so'this'  ..  koe  a- n~  ven~ 
'sorne'  'Plur!'some'  'small'  'the  'all' 
'a certain'  kota  kota  very'  ng§. 
taa  'large'  'al-
'real'  pendere  pendere  so' 
.- ge  'young' 
'only' 
v~k~  v5kS 
'blaek' 
intarg.  deietie 
elts. 
Deseriptive adjeetives  stand next  to  the  head  noun  with 
variation between  their immediately  preeeding  or  fol~owing. 
Pronominal  elements  follow at  a  distanee  either to the left or 
to  the right;  and  elements  reinforeing reference identification 
like  'real',  'only',  'the very',  'all'  (cf.  the  position of ~ 
in German)  are  found  at the  outer ends  pre- or postnominally. 
A very different situation is  found  in Lamutian,  a  Northern 
Tungusie  language  as  spoken  around  the  Okho~sk Sea  (Benzing 
1955).  Word  order  in this  language  appears  to be  very  free.  No 
serialization properties  comparable  to  those  of German  or  Sango 
have  been  found.  Instead the  grammar  reports  a  very  rieh system 
of suffixes marking  off different  elasses  and  subclasses  of ad-
jectives of different fixation potential which is reminiscent 
of the  classes  found  in German. 
The  suffix  -~  marks  off adjeetives  denoting  'small 
spatial extension',  its absence  implies  'large spatialex-
tension'  (Benzing,  op.cit.:25). 
Reference  to  an  object  identifiable for  the hearer due 
to previous  mention  (defi~iteness) is brought  about  by  infixa-
tion of ihe  element  -n- in both the  head  noun  and  an  adjective: - 27  -
(20)  mun  aj.iry.un  diwad.a~iun tull~ bisni 
our  good-aforementioned birch-tree-aforementioned 
outside is  (op.cit.:S4). 
Lamutian  does  not  have  an article, neither definite nor  in-
definite. 
The  narrovdng  dO\lTn  of sets is brought  about  by  a  number  of 
collective suffixes  (op.cit. :26f.): 
... 
-je  'collective for things  singled out' 
-(a)g  'collective for  things  not  singled out' 
-t  'collective for  things  not  singled out  which  are  of 
small  extension' 
-k+~(a)  'mass',  especially  'skin of  anima  1 , 
-nr~  'mass  consisting of similar elements' 
Here  again we  are  confronted with progressive  identification 
of referents,  hence  with  the  dimension  of determination. 
Although  the  facts  are vastly different  from  those discussed 
for  German,  thc  two  orders  of facts  become  quite  comparable 
under  the  'dimensional'  view. Bibliography 
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